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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

JAMES PRIEUR,
Petitioner and Appellant,
Appeal No. 20180704-CA
vs.

THE ENSIGN GROUP INC.,
Defendant and Appellee.
---0000000---

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT'S DECISION TO REFUSE TO RATIFY THE PARTIES
STIPULATED-TO AGREEMENT WAS NOT HARMLESS
Appellee argues that the Court's decision to ratify the stipulated agreement
was harmless. In support of their argument, Appellee attempts to note that the
Court's findings in Birch and Zundel are inapposite to the case at bar. Appellant
disagrees as the nature of a stipulated agreement is contractual in nature and does
not vary if the stipulation is on a waiver of lien rights, a property settlement, or, as
in the case at bar, an agreement between attorneys.
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It is settled that stipulations are conclusive and binding on the parties, unless
good cause is shown for relief. See Higley v. McDonald, 685 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah
1984). This court "cannot overlook or disregard stipulations which are absolute and
unequivocal. Stipulations of attorneys may not be disregarded or set aside at
will." L.P.S. by Lutz v. Lamm, 708 F.2d 537, 539 (10th Cir.1983). We find that
having stipulated to the trial court's actions, the Estate may not now complain
about them on appeal. See Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1980).
DLB Collection Tr. by Helgesen & Waterfall v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah

Ct. App. 1995).
In fact, this Court has previously analyzed the nature of stipulated agreements
between counsel as it relates to the extension of discovery periods in Townhomes
at Pointe Meadows Owners Ass 'n.

In Townhomes, as in the case at bar, Plaintiff argues that the district court
abused its discretion in denying the Association's motion to extend the discovery
deadlines and ordering summary judgment because the Association had a
reasonable basis for failing to comply with the deadlines to name expert
witnesses-that the defendant's counsel had agreed to an extension of the
deadlines. Townhomes at Pointe Meadows Owners Ass 'n v. Pointe Meadows
Townhomes, LLC, 2014 UT App 52, ,r 10, 329 P.3d 815, 818. (Superseded by Rule

on other grounds).
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The Court ultimately concluded that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion, because Plaintiff in that matter had only reached a timely stipulation
with one of the named parties, not all of them. "We agree with the district court
that it was not reasonable for the Association to rely on the stipulation of only
some of the defendants in this complex, multi-party litigation in choosing to let its
obligations under the amended case management order lapse." Id.
In the instant case, as noted in Appellant's initial Motion, Appellant repeatedly
relied on proposals brought by Appellee' s Counsel to postpone discovery in an effort
to forego expending costs in discovery. Appellee approached Appelllant and
expressed an interest in attempting to mediate this case prior to incurring expert
discovery costs. (R. 410-425). The parties scheduled a mediation to take place on
July 11, 2016, which was postponed at the request of defense counsel for personal
reasons. See Id.
The parties were able to reschedule the mediation to take place on August 25,
2016, with Lew Quigley as the mediator. However, the parties were unable to reach
an agreement on the date of the mediation, and Mr. Quigley continued
communicating with both parties in an attempt to resolve the matter without further
litigation.
Toward the end of 2016, Mr. Quigley informed Appellant's previous counsel,
Brandon Kidman, that settlement on this case would be unlikely. See Id. Mr. Kidman
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then reached out to Defendants' counsel in order to come up with a new discovery
plan now that a resolution to the case without proceeding with litigation was
unlikely. See Id.
The parties were able to finalize a new Stipulation and submitted a proposed
case management order to the Court that would assist in allowing the case to move
forward. (R. 120-122). Both parties anticipated that expert discovery would not begin
until early 2017. Id. The parties anticipated that Plaintiffs would disclose their
experts on February 28, 2017. Id.
Time and time again Appellant relied on the proposals of Appellee to delay
litigation in this matter. Then, prior to the agreed upon deadline, Appellee brought its
Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court's findings in this matter were not harmless. If the agreed upon
deadlines had been ratified by the Court, expert disclosures would have been tiely
made prior to February 28, 2017. There would have been no basis for the Court's
summary judgment order as expert testimony would have been a genuine issue of
material fact.
Appellee has profited based upon Appellant's, perhaps naYve, reliance on their
insistence that discovery be postponed. Appellant possibly should have named their
expert witnesses in accordance with the Court's scheduling order-but based upon
their reliance on the verbal, and later signed, agreements with Counsel, Appellant
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understandably relied, to their detriment upon their agreement with Appellee.
The case at bar is distinguishable from this Court's finding in Townhomes as
there was no failure by Appellant to reach stipulations with all opposing parties.
Appellant had multiple agreements in place with the Defendant in the underlying
case. As such, the Court abused its discretion in overlooking the reasonable basis for
Appellant's failure to timely name expert witnesses.
Appellee's Brief fails to argue against Appellant's argument that the Court's
actions were arbitrary and capricious as there was no motion by Appellee to
rescind their stipulation:
[A] court has the discretion to set aside a stipulation under certain
conditions. First, the party seeking relief from the stipulation must
request it by motion from the trial court. Second, the motion to repudiate

the stipulation must be timely filed. Third, it must show that the stipulation
was "entered into inadvertently or for justifiable cause."

Inadvertence

cannot be the basis for repudiation when the mistake was "due to failure to
exercise due diligence, [or if it could] have been avoided by the exercise of
ordinary care." We have also noted that "[i]t is unlikely that a stipulation
signed by counsel and filed with the court was entered into inadvertently."
Fourth, the lower court must state its basis for relieving the parties of the
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stipulation. ("In the absence of any articulated 'justifiable cause,' we must
reverse the withdrawal of the stipulation." Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of

Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2001 UT 11,

,r

21, 20 P.3d 287, 293 (Internal

Citations Omitted) (Emphasis Added).
The Court's decision to terminate discovery in the matter was unwarranted as
the parties were of one accord as to the need for further discovery. Based upon this
unanimity of purpose of the parties and the lack of any need for judicial
determination by the Court, the Court should have allowed the parties' stipulatedto agreement to stand and their failure to ratify the agreement between the parties
was an abuse of discretion.
POINT II
APPELLANT PROPERLY PRESERVED ARGUMENTS AS TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND NEW TRIAL
Approximately half of Appellee's Brief is devoted to arguing that Appellant's
failed to timely preserve for appeal arguments against the Trial Court's Order of
Summary Judgment and Order for New Trial. This argument is defeated by reference
to the record.
As a preliminary note, Appellant apologizes for not addressing this issue in its
initial brief. As will be noted below, it was clear that these arguments were
preserved. However, Appellant asks the Court to entertain Appellant's argument on

6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

this matter as it was only raised in Appellee's brief. As the Court has noted:
[F] aimess to the respondent is not a concern if it is the respondent who first

raises an issue in the opposing brief. In fact, our appellate rules expressly
direct an appellant to "answer[ ] any new matter set forth in the opposing
brief." Utah R.App.P. 24(c). Therefore, if an appellant responds in the reply
brief to a new issue raised by the appellee in its opposing brief, the issue is not
waived. This is also generally the rule with other courts that have considered
this issue.

Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, iJ 24, 16 P.3d 540, 545.
Appellee made a similar argument before the trial Court, arguing that
Appellant had not brought its Motion for a New Trial in a timely manner after the
Court's order of Summary Judgment. In its July 26, 2018 Order, the Court noted that
Appellant's Motion for New Trial was submitted in a timely manner:
Defendants argue Plaintiffs' motion is untimely because it
was not filed within 28 days following the Court's ruling which
granted summary judgement against Plaintiffs. Case law does not
support Defendants' position on this issue.
A Rule 59 motion is timely if it is filed within 28 days of the
entry of judgment. Rule 58A identifies when a judgement is filed.
Rule 54 defines what a judgment is. The Court granted Defendants
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motion for summary judgement on April 12, 2017. That ruling
dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims against all served defendants.
However, the ruling did not resolve all claims against all defendants
as required by Rule 54. There remained one unserved defendant
potentially subject to Plaintiffs' claims.
In York v. Performance Auto, Inc., 2011 UT App 257, ,12, 264
P.3d 212, the Appellate Court ruled:
Under Hunter, the order of May 28, 2009, dismissing [a
named and served party] as a defendant in this case is not a
final order. By dismissing the only served co-defendant, the
trial court did not dispose of the case but converted it into an
action against the remaining unserved defendants. It may well
be that service on the unserved defendants 1s now
impracticable or legally foreclosed. Nevertheless, until the
trial court enters an order concluding the litigation as to all
litigants, including unserved defendants, York has no final
order from which to appeal.
As in York, in the present case, Defendants' motion for
summary judgment did not result in a judgment or final order, only
the dismissal of the served parties. When Plaintiffs' claims against
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the remaining party were dismissed on March 30, 2018, all issues
against all parties were resolved, and the time for filing post
judgment motions and/or appeals began to run. Plaintiffs filed their
motion for a new trial on April 27, 2018, the 28th day following the
order. Plaintiffs' motion is timely.
The Trial Court correctly noted that Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial based
upon the Summary Judgment deficiencies presently before the Appellate Court
was not required until all parties had been disposed of in the trial court. Based
upon binding case law in York, Plaintiff appropriately preserved its rights to
appeal the Court's Summary Judgment Order and Refusal to Grant a New Trial,
as those issues were not ripe for Appeal until March 30, 2018.
Therefore, Appellant notes that it appropriately and timely preserved its
right to appeal this matter by virtue of their Motion for New Trial on April 27,
2018. As such, the Court is warranted in making a finding on the merits.
CONCLUSION
This case is before this Court on review of the order of Summary Judgment
granted against Appellant by the Court under Rule 56(a). Petitioner and Appellee
had a fully executed stipulation which the Court chose not to ratify. There is no
compelling reason to refuse ratification of the parties' stipulation. As such, the
Court's order of summary judgment should be reversed, and the matter should be
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remanded to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing.
DATED this 20th day of March, 2019.
BIGHORN LAW.

~-~~
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 20th day of March, 2019, Appellant served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF upon the parties
listed below via email.
Stephen T. Hester
Kimberley L. Hansen
CORNE KINGHORN
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: 801-363-4300
shester@cohnekinghom.com

khansen@cohnekinghom.com
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I, Allen M. Young, certify that this Brief complies with URAP
24(a)(l l)(A) paragraph (g), governing the number of pages or words in the instant
reply brief.
I
also
certify
that
this
Rule 21, governing public and private records.

Brief

complies

with

~-~r- ~;/
Attorney for Appellant

12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

